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Abstract 
 
  With the implementation of “one Air Force, one network” under way it is 
important to look at how the Air Force plans to incorporate the medical field and 
its unique systems, networks, and mission.  The medical field presents distinctive 
problems not seen in other areas.  Open network vulnerabilities in the medical 
information systems not only pose a problem for the individual, but to the military 
service also.   
Possible security holes provide both access to vital military & personal 
information (end strength numbers, current status of personnel, social security), 
and a door way into the “network”.  Intruders now can possibly access command 
& control systems and other weapon systems. This research provides insight into 
the current & future information initiatives dealing with the Air Force’s medical 
field and the Department of Defense’s approach to system security.    
This research additionally looks at the laws and regulations dealing with 
privacy and ethical issues.   This purview starts with the recently enacted 
Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability ACT (HIPPA), and 
concludes with the Laws of Armed Conflict.    The research questions were 
answered through the use of a Case Study and a comprehensive literature review.  
The medical and network support teams from two Air Force medical facilities 
were the basis of this study.   
iv 
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MEDICAL DEVICES, SUPPORTING NETWORKS, AND THEIR 
VULNERABILITIES: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE INTEGRATIONOF MEDICAL NETWORKS INTO THE  
THE AIR FORCE INFROMATION NETWORK 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
 Forty minutes.  The amount of time that the missile missed its intended target was 
a mere forty minutes.  Saddam Hussein and his sons had left the restaurant forty minutes 
prior.  Had the information been received earlier or processed faster the war in Iraq could 
have possibly taken a different twist.  What if a cyber attack on our Information Systems 
(IS) was the reason for the delay?     
In today’s joint world of operations it is all about the information. This is true 
regardless of the nature of the information.  The Air Force is increasingly concerned 
about protecting information and the systems and networks that it uses to store, process 
and transmit this information.  In today's globally networked environment the Air Force 
has a growing dependence on information to enable their sophisticated combat 
capabilities.   
We are increasingly vulnerable to potential disruption of our military capability 
due to system failure, human mistakes or errors as well as a range of deliberate attacks 
from adversaries who can leverage readily available, easy-to-use, low-cost technologies.  
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Protecting our information systems and networks requires a multi-faceted approach.  In 
addition to sound engineered and implemented technical capabilities a singular direction, 
policy, procedures, and trained personnel are necessary. 
The Air Force is in the midst of a transformation to a force capable of rapid 
expeditionary joint operations.    The Air Force’s Vision 2020 — Global Vigilance, 
Reach and Power captures that philosophy. This strategic plan implements this vision by 
linking the capabilities the Air Force needs in the future with its core competencies which 
are outlined in AF 2020. 
 
Information Superiority- The ability to control and exploit information to our 
nation’s advantage-ensuring decision dominance. (USAF, 2001) 
 
Former Air Force chief of staff Gen Ryan stated this:  
“Air Force Vision 2020 acknowledges information superiority as a core Air Force 
competency because it provides our joint team the ability to control information to our 
nation's advantage and ensures we have decision dominance. Decision dominance means 
we can make smart decisions faster than our adversaries can. Wiser use of information 
technology is our edge... We must continue to expand this decisive, network-enabled 
combat edge.  Modernizing our information systems ranks with other top Air Force 
modernization priorities.  The combat power of our top-of-the-line weapon systems is 
enabled by our information network's ability to tie critical information together faster 
than anyone else can”. (Ryan 2001) 
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General Ryan and Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Peters realized that the Air Force was 
failing in this regard.   
 "General Ryan and I are convinced that we can no longer run the Air Force with 
one foot in the future and one foot in prehistoric times," Secretary Peters said. "We need 
an over-arching Air Force information technology architecture that draws on the Internet 
and best commercial practices and a migration plan that moves us over time into 
compliance with this architecture. Equally important - indeed, perhaps more important - 
we need to reshape our business processes to make optimal use of information 
technology." (Peters, 2001) 
 
General Ryan and Dr. Peters held a conference with Fortune 500 Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) and CIOs (Chief Information officers) to discuss their companies 
approach to information.  The results of this summit Air Force Information Technology 
Initiatives: Information Technology services consolidation (2001) included goals to have 
integrated centrally managed AF IT enterprise services and trusted delivery of 
information supporting the war fighter.  The main concept revolves around an enterprise, 
or corporate networking environment, and capitalizes on industry best practice.  The goal 
is to give Air Force people worldwide instant desktop access to information they need to 
conduct peacetime and combat operations.  
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Information Technology Initiatives 
There are numerous initiatives under way in the implementing the strategic goals 
outlined under the One Air Force, One Network policy.  The Combat Information 
Transport System (CITS) is one of these initiatives.  It will modernize the information 
transport capability at each Air Force base replacing obsolete copper cable with the fiber 
technology, improve network management and upgrade voice phone service with new 
digital switches.  Medical Information Technology Transition (MITT) is part of CITS.  
The critical nature and volume of medical information accompanied with possible life 
and death situations present significant hurdles to system security and limiting 
vulnerabilities to the entire Air force network.   
 
Research Objective/Questions   
  The purpose of this study is to assess the Air Force’s implementation of the transition 
(MITT) of medical information systems into the Air Force Network 
Research Question 
This research seeks to answer the question:  How is the Air Force addressing the 
integration of the medical systems and networks under the policy of “One Air Force, One 
Network” (Ryan 2001)?  
Investigative Questions.
Multiple questions will be addressed in order to answer the research question: 
1. How are medical devices integrated into the medical facilities networks? 
2. How does the plan address adherence to HIPPA? 
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3. Does the integration of the medical information systems into the base networks 
change the classification of the system under the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC)?  If so, does this make them more susceptible to attack? 
4. Is the implementation of several projects/initiatives increasing the possibility for 
security vulnerabilities? 
5. Is direction being given from a single point or multiple agencies/commands? 
6. Are there other issues that are not addressed under the current plan? 
Research Focus 
The focus of the research is the implementation of MITT at Site 1 and Site 2.  
This research will concentrate on the hospital and network support staff efforts to 
integrate the medical information systems.  This is not an assessment of the facilities 
or their respective staffs. 
Proposed Methodology 
The research will be conducted as a Case Study since no control over the 
behavioral events can be accomplished.  The study will be completed in two phases.  The 
first phase will consist of face to face interviews with Site 1 personnel.  The second phase 
will consist of telephone interviews with Site 2 medical and communication personnel. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
The current AF Initiative (MITT) identifies 90 facilities worldwide which have 
been chosen for integration.  This research focuses on the integration of only the medical 
communities at Site 1 and Site 2.  By limiting the study to two bases some areas of 
concern may be neglected due to the uniqueness of their individual locations, units, and 
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existing networks at those two locations.  Little research exists on the current Air Force 
projects.  As a result, there is not much to build upon.  Since the research is only being 
conducted at two locations it is possible that the findings will not be representative of the 
entire Air Force.  Time represents the final major limitation for the study.  The 
importance and difficulty of this study command more time than this effort can provide.  
This study aims to establish the basis for additional research.      
Implications 
During 2000, Air Force security enforcement tools identified and denied 315 
million suspicious connection attempts.   The AF experienced one unauthorized access to 
its networks by an unauthorized outsider for every 20 million suspicious connection 
attempts.  During 2001, the number of suspicious connections jumped from 315 million 
to over 1.1 billion.   Fortunately the rate of unauthorized connections by an outsider 
declined to one for every 84 million suspicious connections attempts(Gilligan 2002).   
The addition of the medical networks to the overall network provides a greater 
opportunity for those who want to gain access or due damage to the Air Force networks.  
This research will aid in pinpointing possible weaknesses (extensive use of waivers for 
security patch implementation, Food and Drug Administration governance of medical 
devices, numerous ongoing AF network initiatives) in the existing information assurance 
policies and procedures governing the medical networks.  
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Preview 
This chapter provided a basis for the need for information security for medical 
networks.  The Air Force vision for information technology and ensuring that the war 
fighter has the tools he or she needs to do their job was discussed.  Chapter II will cover 
current plans to accomplish that vision and general literature relevant to the dilemma of 
integrating the Air Force medical networks, network security, personal privacy, and the 
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and how they might affect the efforts. 
Chapter III will explain the methodology used in this study to establish the 
framework of issues that the Air Force plan might present during implementation.  
Chapter IV will present the data analysis and results from the data collected in this study.  
Chapter V will discuss the findings of this case study and their relevance to the problem.  
It will also present limitations of this study and recommendations for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Overview 
Today there is rapid movement toward increased use of interconnected networks.  
Although this trend promises many benefits, it also poses many risks.  The military 
medical field and its technology introduce unique aspects in regards to systems and 
network connectivity.  Partnerships with civilian healthcare facilities exist due to today’s 
business environment and scarceness of qualified Air Force personnel.  Open network 
vulnerabilities in the medical information systems not only pose a problem for the 
Medical Healthcare System (MHS), but to the military service itself.  Ill guarded medical 
information systems provide a doorway in the Air Force’s network.  Command & Control 
and personnel information is now accessible.   Potential attack to systems carrying this 
information as well as weapon and intelligence systems are possible.   
The purpose of this research is to assess the Air Force’s handling of those unique aspects 
under the current initiative to transition medical information technology into the Air 
Force Network.     
This literature review examines the writings relevant to the research topic of integrating 
the Air Force medical networks.  This endeavor will provide necessary information vital to the 
assessment of the Air Force’s plan.  First, the guiding principles and reasons for coordinated 
implementation of information technology projects are discussed.   The examination will cover 
both the Air Force’s current IT strategy and several of the numerous information technology 
projects underway.   Following this is a look at the legal implications inherent to integrating the 
medical networks into the Air Force’s network.  Lastly, a review of the benefits gained by 
standardization will be performed.  
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Coordinated Implementation 
Air Force Vision 2020, Air Force Information Strategy, and One Air Force, One Network 
As stated in chapter one the Air Force is under going a transformation to a force 
capable of rapid expeditionary joint operations.    The Air Force’s Vision 2020 — Global 
Vigilance, Reach and Power captures that philosophy.   It provides the direction and 
foundation for subsequent Air Force IT doctrine.  The plan states that the Air Force will 
develop and field the critical future capabilities to sustain its core competencies, and the 
command and control through which it employs them (USAF 2001).   
 
One of those seven core competencies is Information Superiority.  AF Vision 
2020 defines this as “the ability to control and exploit information to our nation’s 
advantage to ensure decision dominance” (USAF 2001).  AF Vision 2020 further states 
that leveraging information technology is the means by which to continue transforming 
the Air Force’s operational capabilities and command and control (USAF 2001).   The 
Air Force looked internally after gathering information from the industry leaders in the 
information technology field and formulated One Air Force; one network.   
The strategy is based on adapting the latest commercially available information 
technologies.  AF Vision 2020, One Air Force; one network, DOD guidance, and task 
force concepts of operations all influence the direction and make up of the Air Force 
Strategic Plan.  The outcome of this formulation is the Air Force Information Strategy 
(See Figure 1). 
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A shortcoming to the Air Force Information strategy developing process depicted 
below is that it leaves MAJCOM’s and functional supporting plans open to personal 
interpretation by their respective leaders and commanders.  The possibility for plans 
being developed or implemented differently to satisfy a customer locally instead 
following the prescribed guidance exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Cycle for developing the Air Force Information Strategy  (USAF 2001). 
 
The purpose of the Air Force Information Strategy is to bridge the gap between 
top-level vision and strategy documents, which include the Task Force CONOPS, and the 
actual planning, decision-making and resourcing activities within the Air Force.  The Air 
Force Information Strategy consists of nine goals through which the Air Force hopes to 
empower Air force personnel to accomplish the transformation outlined in the Air Force 
Strategic Plan.  The goals are listed in the table on the next page (USAF 2002).  The 
goals form the framework for the development of detailed planning objectives, 
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implementation projects, and subsequent performance metrics to determine the Air 
Force’s success.  For this research we are concerned with only two of them; goals two 
and three.  Goal # 2 implies that a single global network must be established and it must 
capable of providing secure data to decision makers at any time.  Goal #3 states the Air 
Force must be able to successfully protect its information and supporting systems.  
To do this the Air Force has employed a “defense in depth” approach to simultaneously secure 
multiple layers of the network, systems, and applications. This tactic requires defining a security 
architecture that identifies and maps security enforcement policies to employment of protection 
capabilities.  This security design must be executed across all Air Force networks and systems. 
Table 1.  9 Goals of Air Force Information Strategy. 
Goal  
1 Provide decision-makers and all Air Force personnel with on-demand access to authoritative, relevant and 
sufficient information to perform their duties efficiently and effectively. 
2 Ensure worldwide, real-time and secure access to information via a single integrated global network 
environment through a robust digital communications infrastructure. 
3 Protect Air Force information resources from attack and/or intrusion by  both outside forces and internal 
disruption. 
4 Ensure that Air Force integrated information systems are architected to enable modular, platform-
independent information management capabilities and are interoperable with Department of Defense and 
other government information systems. 
5 Leverage information technology to support and improve Air Force processes to increase both efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
6 Ensure the Air Force takes advantage of state-of-the-art IT and best commercial practices. 
7 Implement knowledge management practices and technologies to assure knowledge is identified, captured, 
and shared. 
8 Empower a focused, well-trained and motivated workforce prepared to continually search out and embrace 
new information-based capabilities for the Air Force. 
9 Ensure responsible stewardship of Air Force financial resources spent on information management and 
related information technology 
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Air Force Information Technology Initiatives 
Medical Field initiatives 
There are several IT initiatives currently underway that directly affect the medical 
information systems and networks.  The main project is the Medical Information Technology 
Transition (MITT) Last Mile Design.  Under this program the medical systems and networks at 
90 military medical treatment facilities all over the world will be integrated into the Air Force’s 
network.    All medical information systems, networks, and networked devices will be connected 
into the respective location’s base network in a standardized design, all placed under base 
Network Control Center (NCC) and Network Operations and Security Center (NOSC) 
management (Headquarters Electronics Systems Center 2004).   
Several organizations have vital roles in this venture. The Air Force Surgeon 
General (AF/SG) and the Air Force Medical Support Agency (AFMSA) are responsible 
for presenting the medical community needs to the Air Force Communications Agency 
(AFCA).  AF/XI and AF/IL provide operational guidance covering the AF network 
policy. The Combat Information Transport System (CITS) Project Management Offices 
(PMO) created this design.   
The MITT LMD isn’t an implementation plan; it’s technical in nature.  In fact, the 
document states that.  It stipulates that each base’s medical facility’s integration into the 
Air Force’s network could potentially be different due to the existing medical network.  
The MITT LMD provides two different designs.  It first presents a final end state that 
according to the CITS PMO  “logically meets medical requirements while 
accommodating AF policy”(Headquarters Electronics Systems Center 2004) (see Figure 
12 
2 below).   Secondly, the MITT LMD offers an interim state (Figure 3).  It accommodates 
the different access points traffic might take given its source and destination.  This 
interim design is due to the timeliness in which the final end state can be achieved to help 
mitigate risks in the near term (Headquarters Electronics Systems Center 2004). 
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Figure 2- The Last Mile Design - Final Design. (Headquarters Electronics Systems Center 2004) 
The design does offer five different options for connecting into the network; weighing the 
advantages and disadvantages of each.  Implementing the standardized MITT LMD includes 
support for Composite Health Care System (CHCS) II traffic.  The CHCS II is a medical and 
dental clinical information system that will generate and maintain a comprehensive, life-long, 
computer-based patient record (CPR) for each MHS beneficiary.   CHCS II was designed to meet 
the challenge of making medical and dental records immediately available to providers caring for 
a highly mobile population that includes 1.4 million active duty Armed Service members around 
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the world.  The system provides authorized users with secure electronic access to a Department 
of Defense (DoD) beneficiary's comprehensive health record, which includes data on 
preventative care, illnesses, injuries, and exposures treated at any military treatment facility 
(MTF).  All CHCS II users will have access to any eligible beneficiary's medical/dental record 
within seconds from any MTF in the world(Office 2004) .  
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Figure 3- The Last Mile Design- Interim Design.(Headquarters Electronics Systems Center 2004) 
 
Legal Implications 
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
One of the most critical subjects for today’s military is the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC), also known as the Law of War.  What is LOAC? According to Joint Publication 1-02; 
"That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities" (Staff 2001).  
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LOAC is based upon two main sources.   These are customary international law and treaty law.  
Customary international law arose out of the conduct of nations during hostilities and binding 
upon all nations.  Treaty law (also called conventional law) arose from international treaties and 
only binds those nations that have ratified a particular treaty.  Treaty law is generally divided 
into two overlapping areas: Hague law (named for treaty negotiations held over the years at The 
Hague, Netherlands) and Geneva law (named for treaty negotiations held over the years at 
Geneva, Switzerland).  The treaty law that pertains to this research is Hague law.   It is 
concerned mainly with the means and methods of warfare (e.g., lawful and unlawful weapons, 
targeting) (Strand 2004). 
There are several purposes of LOAC. Some of which include limiting the effects 
of the conflict, safeguarding the individual rights of and protecting combatants and non- 
combatants from unnecessary suffering, and preventing the conflict from getting worse.   
The basic legal principle of LOAC is military necessity.  This is defined as “the 
application of only that degree of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of 
war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least 
expenditure of life, time and physical resources.”  Attacks must be limited to military 
objectives.  This principle imposes a requirement to distinguish between military 
objectives and civilian objects (Strand 2004). 
 
Military objectives are objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.  Examples of this include troops, bases, supplies, lines of 
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communications, and headquarters.  Civilian objects are such things as places of worship, 
schools, hospitals, and dwellings.  These things can lose their protective status if they are 
used to make a contribution to the military action.  An attacker must not intentionally 
attack civilians or employ methods or means (weapons or tactics) that would cause 
excessive collateral civilian casualties.  However, a defender has an obligation to separate 
civilians and civilian objects (either in the defender’s country or in an occupied area) 
from military targets. 
These guidelines suggest that data of a medical nature be physically segregated as much 
as possible from information that can invite hostile targeting.  Complete physical segregation is 
not currently feasible due to cost, maintenance, and other considerations.  Most AF bases do not 
completely segregate medical and non-medical traffic because an Air Force base is considered to 
be a trusted network for medical traffic.  Also given the make up of the United States adversaries 
today will it matter if the data isn’t separated?  Today’s enemies either just don’t care if 
collateral damage occurs or they possess the tools to spin control the damage through control of 
the media. 
Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
The LMD must protect the privacy of medical traffic according to Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) constraints.  HIPAA went into 
effect on April 14, 2003, is intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
health care system by standardizing electronic data interchange.  HIPAA has three main 
parts: (1) Insurance Portability, (2) Fraud Enforcement (accountability), and (3) 
Administrative Simplification. 
16 
HIPAA requires appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to 
protect the privacy of health information.  The final Security Rule released in February 
2003, contains specific standards for implementing physical and technical safeguards of 
protected healthcare information.  Organizations must comply with the security 
requirements by the April, 2005 deadline.  There are five areas of note- Facility access 
controls, workstation use, workstation security, Device and media controls, and Access 
controls (Services and Rights 2003). 
In the area of facility access controls healthcare organizations must implement 
policies and procedures to limit physical access to electronic information systems and the 
facilities in which they are housed, while ensuring that properly authorized access is 
allowed.  The workstation use section stipulates that healthcare organizations implement 
policies and procedures that specify the proper functions to be performed, the manner in 
which those functions are to be performed, and the physical attributes of the surroundings 
of workstations that can access electronic protected health information(Services and 
Rights 2003).   
The workstation security section requires organizations to implement physical 
safeguards for all workstations that access electronic protected health information in 
order to restrict access to authorized users.  The device and media controls section states 
organizations must implement policies and procedures that control the acquisition, 
disposal, and movement of hardware and electronic media containing personal health 
information.   
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The final section access controls requires organizations to implement unique user 
identification and emergency access procedures.  They are to ensure that protected 
healthcare information is available to authorized individuals. The healthcare institution 
must utilize technical safeguards to enable secure access to data(Services and Rights 
2003).  In addition to accomplishing those tasks HIPAA mandates that healthcare 
organizations implement security risk management.  Fundamental to an effective security 
risk management program is a clear understanding of the organization’s exposure to 
infrastructure vulnerability and an ability to detect and assess threats.   Developing 
detection, response, and control processes to address these areas is a priority.
  Security and risk management initiatives often fall short because they rely on manual 
methods to document infrastructures that are vastly complex and constantly changing.   
The Air Force has selected OCTAVE ® (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation) to prevent that and ensure HIPAA compliance. 
OCTAVE 
OCTAVE is a risk based strategic assessment and planning technique for security. 
OCTAVE is self-directed.  Air Force personnel will assume responsibility for setting the 
organization’s security strategy. The technique leverages the personnel’s knowledge of 
the medical facility’s security-related practices and processes to capture the current state 
of security practice within the medical facility. 
Standards 
Attacks and trends- Reasons to rethink standards
Information technology has become embedded in the daily operations of the US 
government.   Valuable government and business assets, along with critical services, are now at 
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risk over the Internet and other information infrastructures.   Disruption or attacks on the 
computers and the information systems employed could have devastating consequences.  The 
widespread use of databases threatens the privacy of individuals. Increased use of computers in 
safety-critical applications, including the storage and processing of medical records data, 
increases the chance that accidents or attacks on computer systems can cost people their 
lives(Pethia 2002).   
 
Figure 4- Attack sophistication Vs intruder technical knowledge(Pethia 2001) 
 
“There is little evidence of movement toward improvement in the security of most 
products; software developers do not devote enough effort to applying lessons learned 
about the causes of vulnerabilities. We continue to see the same types of vulnerabilities in 
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newer versions of products that we saw in earlier versions”(Pethia 2002).  That is not to 
say that there isn’t new areas intruders find to attack.    The Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) Coordination Center has been tracking intruder activity 
since1988.  CERT has made the following observations over that time.   The technical 
skill and knowledge an intruder needs to possess has diminished (Figure 4).  The amount 
of damage an attack causes has increased dramatically.  In addition intruders are gaining 
leverage through automation and exploiting network interconnections and moving easily 
through the infrastructure.  They are also becoming more skilled at masking their 
behavior.  CERT has also identified the disturbing attack trends noted below in table 2.  
The trends seen by the CERT/CC indicate that organizations relying on the Internet face 
significant challenges to ensure that their networks operate safely and that their systems 
continue to provide critical services even in the face of attack. 
Table 2- Attack Trends (Center 2002) 
Trends  
Automation Level of automation in attack tools continues to increase. Attack tools 
exploit vulnerabilities as a part of the scanning activity, which increases 
the speed of propagation 
Increased 
sophistication of 
attack tool 
Attack tool signatures are more difficult to discover through analysis and 
more difficult to detect through signature-based systems such as antivirus 
software and intrusion detection systems 
Faster Discovery of 
Vulnerabilities 
Subsequent reviews of existing code for examples of the new vulnerability 
class often lead, over time, to the discovery of examples in hundreds of 
different software products. Intruders are often able to discover these 
exemplars before the vendors are able to correct them. 
Increasing 
permeability of 
firewalls 
Technologies are being designed to bypass typical firewall configurations. 
Some protocols marketed as being “firewall friendly” are, in reality, 
designed to bypass typical firewall configurations. 
Increasingly 
asymmetric threat 
With advances in attack technology, a single attacker can relatively easily 
employ a large number of distributed systems to launch devastating 
attacks against a single victim. As the automation of deployment and the 
sophistication of attack tool management both increase, the asymmetric 
nature of the threat will continue to grow. 
Increasing threat 
from infrastructure 
attacks 
They are of increasing concern because of the number of organizations and 
users on the Internet and their increasing dependency on the Internet to 
carry out day-to-day business.  
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The SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute was established in 1989.  It is 
one of the most valuable sources for information security training and certification in the world. 
The SANS Institute develops and maintains the largest collection of research documents about 
various aspects of information security.  In addition the institute operates the Internet Storm 
Center providing alerts to the latest threats and releasing a yearly top 20 list of the most critical 
internet vulnerabilities.  The list contains the ten most commonly exploited vulnerable services in 
Windows and the ten most commonly exploited elements in UNIX and Linux environments.  
Although there are thousands of security incidents each year affecting these operating 
systems, the overwhelming majority of successful attacks target one or more of these twenty 
vulnerable services(Institute 2004). Two new additions to the list of particular interest to this 
research are file sharing and instant messaging (IM).  Instant messaging presents a particular 
challenge to maintaining standards with the Air Force’s "Friends and Family Instant Messenger 
(AFIM)”(Neveu 2005) launched two years ago.  AFIM runs through the AF portal and is 
encrypted.  Program content must also adhere to the established messaging guidance presented in 
AFI 33-119.  But is that enough?    
 According to Richard D. Pethia, former Director of the CERT® Coordination 
Center (CERT/CC) it isn’t. “The second major category of vulnerability includes 
weaknesses in the management and operational practices of system operators”(Pethia 
2003).  Factors that can lead to this weakness are lack of, unclear, or poorly enforced 
organizational security policies and regulations; security roles and responsibilities that are 
not clearly defined or lack of accountability(Pethia 2003).  Poor account management or 
password management by all users can also aid in developing this vulnerability(Pethia 
2003).   
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The weak operational practices of organizations combined with the advanced 
technology that attackers now possess resulted in the number of incidents reported to 
increase to over 137,529 in 2003 and the reported number of vulnerabilities to remain 
relatively constant over the last three years(see figure 5)(Center 2005).  Approximately 
90% of all successful intrusions into the Air Force networks come from known 
vulnerabilities or failure to use sound system protection practices (Butler 2004). 
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Figure 5- Number of Vulnerabilities reported to CERT/CC.(Center 2005) 
 
Faulty or poor practices as those mentioned above have resulted in the US government 
computer systems receiving a D + as an overall grade on the 2004 security report card 
released by the House Government Reform Committee(Vijayan 2005).  The report card is 
issued annually in accordance with the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) of 2002.
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The evaluations are compiled by the committee based on criteria established in FISMA 
(Federal Information Security Management Act) and information provided by each 
agency's inspector general.  The Department of Defense received a overall grade of “D” 
for the second consecutive year (see table 3)(Vijayan 2005).   This doesn’t bode well for 
providing secure, trusted data and the concept of net- centric warfare. 
Table 3- FISMA Computer system security grades(Vijayan 2005) 
SELECTED AGENCIES ’04 ’03 
Department of Transportation A- D+ 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission B+ A 
Environmental Protection Agency B C 
Department of Justice B- F 
Department of the Interior C+ F 
Department of State D+ F 
Department of the Treasury* D+ D 
Department of Defense* D D 
NASA D- D- 
Department of Commerce F C- 
Department of Energy F F 
Department of Homeland Security F F 
*No independent evaluation from the agency’s inspector general was submitted in 2003. 
 
Source: House government reform committee
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Technology has now advanced to the point where it is easy for attackers to take 
advantage of vulnerable machines and bind them together to launch high-powered 
attacks.  Intruders can utilize schemes similar to that depicted in figure 6 and focus them 
onto a single network or system.  This could wreck havoc on DoD systems.  Secretary 
Rumsfeld stated: “some adversaries are using those high-tech tools to develop "offensive 
information operations" that could disrupt military information systems, such as those 
that enable U.S. troops to engage in "network-centric" warfare with other combat units 
and foreign allies. 
"In a networked environment, information assurance is critical," Rumsfeld said. 
"Information systems must be protected from attack, and new capabilities for effective 
information operations must be developed” (Peterson 2002).   
 
Figure 6 – possible cyber attack scenario. 
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Software Standardization 
The Air Force has reached an agreement with Microsoft to provide enterprise wide 
software standardization with a single version of its operating system and applications.  
Mr. John Gilligan, the Air Force CIO stated that “the Air Force endures about one 
network-based attack per week that successfully exploits new vulnerabilities. There’s 
some disruption and loss of capability”(Messmer 2004). 
 
 To combat this issue security, performance and software feature settings will be designed 
specifically for the Air Force. They will be based on inputs from the National Security Agency 
(NSA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Center for Internet Security. 
Utilizing a single version of the Microsoft products and establishing a centralized distribution for 
patch management is also expected to lessen the severe associated time delays and costs. 
Applying software patches is still accomplished manually in the Air Force.  Mr. Gilligan advised 
that “it’s not unusual for patching of vulnerabilities to take months to complete”(Messmer 2004).  
The agreement with Microsoft is slated to save the Air Force $100 million over the next six 
years. 
Some officials believe that cost savings are often the underlying reason for such 
agreements.  Alan Salisbury, chairman of the Center for National Software Studies, said 
standardization usually reduces costs.  "The name of the game continues to be total cost 
of operations, which is dominated by maintenance and support," he said. "Fewer 
configurations equal lower costs (Verton 2004)".   
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Other analysts believe the agreement with Microsoft is similar to the one the 
Department of Energy (DoE) reached with Oracle in 2003(Verton 2004).  Given the 
DoE’s grade of “F” pertaining to the security of their computer systems (see Table 3) it 
appears not to be the best model from which the Air Force should follow. 
 
Medical Devices 
The Air Force currently operates over 100 medical facilities worldwide.  The 
advances in telemedicine and the medical community’s dependency on it greatly increase 
the possibility for attacks to medical networks.  Initiatives such as Composite Health Care 
System II (CHCS II) and Defense Blood Standard System (DBSS) are guaranteeing that 
fact(Office 2004).  Computerized medical devices are at the forefront of susceptible entry 
points into the networks.  Many of these devices use Off-the-shelf (OTS) software such 
as Microsoft Windows.  
 The use of OTS software in a medical device allows the manufacturer to 
concentrate on the application software needed to run device-specific functions. 
However, OTS software intended for general purpose computing may not be appropriate 
for a given specific use in a medical device. The medical device manufacturer using OTS 
software generally gives up software life cycle control, but still bears the responsibility 
for the continued safe and effective performance of the medical device(Food and Drug 
Administration 1999).  Mr. Gilligan, the Air Force CIO has acknowledged that medical 
devices present a unique problem for the Air Force.  He is also aware that these devices 
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face patching issues and are vulnerable to attack left unpatched (Messmer 2004).  To 
address this problem there is currently a separate certification program under which 
vendors must agree to timely patch updates. The Air Force has started to insist on proper 
patch management  in contracts with device vendors(Messmer 2004).   
Currently medical devices fall under the governance of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  It is the FDA’s responsibility to ensure that the vendors complete 
software updates with their medical devices.  The FDA has also issued guidelines to the 
Air Force that will allow direct installation of software patches in certain 
circumstances(Messmer 2004). 
 
Summary 
This chapter provided background information for the multiple ongoing information 
technology projects within the Air Force medical community.  It discussed the need for singular 
direction and a coordinated implementation to prevent possible shortcomings in information 
security.  After this a discussion concerning the legal implications of integrating the medical 
networks into the Air Force network was provided.  A definition of the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) was given and the possible ramifications of medical data integration were explained.  
Closing out the chapter was a dialogue covering standards.   
This discourse was broken down into three areas.  First, the rethinking of the standards 
currently in place due to cyber attacks and today’s trends.  Second, the idea of software 
standardization was covered.  Finally, the area of medical devices and the standards used 
for patch management were discussed. 
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III. Methodology 
 
Overview 
This chapter imparts the approach taken to answer the research and investigative 
questions, presented in chapter I of this research study.  This chapter discusses the 
qualitative research approach, the case study method and its applicability.  Triangulation, 
designing the case study protocol, conducting the case study, evidence analysis, and 
research limitations will also be presented.  This research project uses a multiple site case 
study methodology to examine the Air Force’s integration of medical information 
systems and their networks.  Focused interviews with medical network support personnel 
from two Air Force medical facilities provide the data for analysis. 
 
Qualitative Approach 
Creswell states that qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding 
based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human 
problem.  The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, report 
detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting (Creswell 1998).  
Simply stated qualitative research may be generally defined as a study, which is 
conducted in a natural setting where the researcher, uses an instrument of data collection, 
gathers evidence, analyzes them inductively, focuses on the meaning of participants, and 
describes a process that is both expressive and persuasive in language. 
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Qualitative research studies typically serve one or more of the following 
purposes: 
Description - They can reveal the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, 
relationships, systems or people. 
Interpretation - They enable the researcher to (a) gain insights about the nature of 
particular phenomenon, (b) develop new concepts or theoretical perspectives about the 
phenomenon, and/or (c) discover that problems exist within the phenomenon. 
Verification - They allow a researcher to test the validity of certain assumptions, claims, 
theories, or generalizations within real-world contexts. 
Evaluation - They provide a means through which a researcher can judge the 
effectiveness of particular policies, practices, or innovations. 
 
Characteristics of good qualitative research 
A list of characteristics of a “good” qualitative research is presented below by 
Creswell(Creswell 1998):  
 
       1)  Good qualitative research entails rigorous data collection: 2) The researcher 
collects multiple forms of data, and summarizes them adequately.  3) The study is framed 
within the assumptions and characteristics of the qualitative approach to research.  4) The 
researcher identifies studies and employs one or more traditions of inquiry.  5) The 
researcher starts with a single idea or problem that s/he seeks to understand, not a causal 
relationship of variables.  6) The study involves detailed methods, a rigorous approach to 
data collection, data analysis, and report writing.  7) The writing is so persuasive that the 
reader experiences “being there.”  8) Data is analyzed using multiple levels of 
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abstraction.  That is, the researcher’s work is presented in a way that moves from 
particulars to general levels of abstraction.  9) The writing is clear, engaging, and full of 
unexpected ideas.  10) The story and findings become believable and realistic, accurately 
reflecting all the complexities that exist in real situation (Creswell 1998).   
Case Study Method  
Case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is 
needed (Feagin 1991).  It is the best suited research approach for the topic under study.   
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but only when the 
relevant behaviors cannot be influenced (Yin 1994).   
Case studies are designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the 
participants by using multiple sources of data  (Tellis 1997).  The literature review for 
this research provided only some insight into the current status regarding integration of 
the medical networks in the Air Force.  This gives credence to Leedy’s assertion that 
utilizing the case study method may be especially suitable for learning more about a little 
known or poorly understood situation (Leedy 2001).   
 
Research Design 
 
The decision of which strategy or method to use depends upon three conditions: 
1) the type of research question posed, 2) the extent of control an investigator has over 
the events under study, and 3) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events (Yin 1994).  Table 4 displays each condition and how they relate to the 
five major research methods. 
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Table 4, Strategy for Research Design (Yin, 1994) 
 
Research Design Components 
Yin identified five components of research design that are important for case 
studies: 1) a study's questions, 2) its propositions, if any, 3) its unit(s) of analysis, 4) the 
logic linking the data to the propositions, and 5) the criteria for interpreting the findings 
(Yin 1994). The most important condition for choosing your research strategy is 
identifying the type of research question.  “How” and “why” questions are likely to favor 
the use of case studies, experiments, or histories.  Table 5 lists the four widely used tests 
and tactics to maintain research design quality throughout the study.  How each is 
performed during this research endeavor is the table. 
Design Tests 
 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity is especially problematic in case study research. It has been a 
source of criticism because of potential investigator subjectivity. Yin proposed three 
remedies to counteract this: using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of 
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evidence, and having a draft case study report reviewed by key informants (Yin 1994).  
All three devices are employed in this research.  Multiple sources of evidence include 
multiple cases and focused interview transcripts.  A chain of evidence is established 
through the investigator’s receipt of Air Force implementation plans and documentation 
from the Air Force Surgeon General’s office.  Key informants working in network 
support positions at the medical facilities reviewed the case study report and interviewees 
validated interview transcripts for content and context.  
Internal Validity 
Internal validity is the degree to which the design of a study allows you to 
accurately attribute an observation to a specific cause rather than alternative causes.   It 
can be a problem of "inferences".  This is only a concern in causal (explanatory) case 
studies (Yin 1994).  Internal validity can be strengthened through pattern-matching.  
Pattern- matching compares an empirical pattern with a predicted one.  In explanatory 
case studies internal validity is enhanced if the patterns are related to the dependent or 
independent variables.   In this research study it will be used to see if there are 
identifiable areas of concern.  
External Validity 
External validity deals with knowing whether the results are pertinent beyond the 
immediate case (Yin, 1994).  Can the findings be replicated?  Theory in single case 
studies is one way to address this issue.  Another approach to increase external validity is 
replication logic in multiple case studies.  This research examines multiple cases by 
delving into the integration of medical networks and systems at two Air Force medical 
facilities.  Consequently, replication logic is used to increase external validity. 
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Reliability 
The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study.  Reliability 
deals with demonstrating the operations of a study are repeatable and will provide the 
same results and conclusions if a succeeding investigator follows the procedures a 
preceding investigator did in conducting the same case study (Yin 2003) .    As it is 
alluded to in Table 4 the use of a case study protocol and development of a case study 
database are two strategies for increasing reliability.  In this study, a case study protocol 
is used to increase reliability.   
Table 5.  Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (Yin, 1994:33) 
 
Tests 
 
Case Study Tactic 
Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity • Use multiple sources of evidence 
• Establish chain of evidence 
• Have key informants review draft case 
study report 
data collection 
data collection 
Internal validity 
 
 
• Do pattern-matching 
• Do explanation-building 
• Address rival explanations 
• Use logic models 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
External validity • Use theory in single-case studies 
• Use replication logic in multiple-case 
studies 
research design 
research design 
Reliability • Use case study protocol 
• Develop case study database 
data collection 
data collection 
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Triangulation 
Stake states that the protocols that are used to ensure accuracy and alternative 
explanations are called triangulation (Stake 1995).  Triangulation is the rationale for 
using multiple sources of evidence.  The Case study approach is known as a triangulated 
research strategy.  Snow and Anderson asserted that triangulation can occur with data, 
investigators, theories, and even methodologies(Feagin 1991).  Denzin identified four 
types of triangulation: Data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data 
to remain the same in different contexts; Investigator triangulation, when several 
investigators examine the same phenomenon; Theory triangulation, when investigators 
with different view points interpret the same results; and Methodological triangulation, 
when one approach is followed by another, to increase confidence in the interpretation 
(Denzin 1984). 
The need for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of 
the processes.  In case studies, this could be done by using multiple sources of data; 
consideration must be given to construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability (Yin 1989).  This research study will use multiple data sources to ensure 
accuracy and identify possible alternate explanations.  
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Research Questions  
Chapter I introduced the following main research question and investigative 
questions: 
Main Research Question 
How is the Air Force addressing the integration of the medical systems and 
networks under the policy of “One Air Force, One Network” (Ryan 2001)?  
 
Investigative Questions 
1. How are medical devices integrated into the medical facilities networks? 
2. How does the plan address adherence to HIPPA? 
3. Does the integration of the medical information systems into the base networks 
change the classification of the system under the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC)?  If so, does this make them more susceptible to attack? 
4. Is the implementation of several projects/initiatives increasing the possibility for 
security vulnerabilities? 
5. Is direction being given from a single point or multiple agencies/ commands? 
6. Are there other issues that are not addressed under the current plan? 
 
Logic Linking of Data to Propositions 
Each proportion directs attention to something that should be examined within the 
scope of the research.  However, not all studies need to have propositions.  An 
exploratory study, rather than having propositions, would have a stated purpose or criteria 
on which the success will be judged.   
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Research Propositions and Model 
1. Research will identify the issues that the Air Force needs to be concerned with when 
integrating the medical networks and systems 
2. Research will identify sources of concern with integrating the medical networks and 
systems. 
3. Research will show advantages and disadvantages of integrating the medical systems 
and networks into the one Air force, one network 
 
Figure 7- Research model 
Research Procedures 
This section illustrates the procedures used to answer each research question.  The 
answer to the main research question is inferred by reviewing answers to each of the 
investigative questions and the literature review.   
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The table below identifies how each research question is addressed.  Interview questions 
are listed later in this chapter under the Data Collection section. 
Table 6- Research question addressing. 
Investigative Question Method Addressed 
1 Answered by interview questions 3,4,5,6,7 
2 Answered by interview question 6 & 
Literature review 
3 Answered by  interview question 4 & 
Literature review  
4 Answered by interview questions 8 -14 
5 Answered by interview questions 2, 8-
10,12 
6 Answered by  interview questions 1, 15 
 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis defines what the case is. It is a critical factor in the case study.  Case 
studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to 
understanding the system being examined.  Linking the data to propositions and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings are the least developed aspects in case studies (Yin 
1994).  The unit of analysis for this research study is the medical Networks, Systems, and 
devices at each site. 
 
Criteria for Interpreting Results 
"Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study" (Yin 1994).  The 
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analysis of case study is one of the least developed aspects of the case study methodology 
(Yin 2003).  Yin stated that every investigation should have a general analytic strategy, 
so as to guide the decision regarding what will be analyzed and for what reason (Yin 
1994). 
The strategy will help you to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling 
analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations (Yin 2003).  In general, the 
analysis will rely on the theoretical propositions that led to the case study. The specific 
analytic techniques that will be employed for this research are: pattern-matching, 
theoretic propositions, and cross-case synthesis.   
The theoretic propositions: issues that the Air Force needs to be concerned with 
when integrating the medical networks and systems, sources of concern, advantages and 
disadvantages of integrating the medical systems and networks into the one Air force, one 
network make up the general analytic strategy.  If theoretical propositions are not present, 
then the researcher could consider developing a descriptive framework around which the 
case study is organized (Tellis 1997). 
Conducting the Case Study 
According to Yin  preparing for data collection is just as important as the data 
collection (Yin 2003).  Both areas are detailed below. 
Preparing for Data Collection 
Preparing for data collection includes the skills of the investigator, the training 
and preparation for the specific case study, the case study protocol development, the 
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screening of candidate case studies, and the conduct of a pilot case study (Yin 2003).  
Each subsection is discussed in further detail below. 
Skills of the Investigator 
Many people choose to use the case study method because they believe it is easy.  
This is completely inaccurate.  Due to the lack of an established routine (unlike most of 
the methodologies) the case study is actually much more tasking on your person (Yin 
2003).  There aren’t any tests that will distinguish whether or not a person will make a 
good case study investigator, but the table below contains commonly required skills that 
will greatly aid in their endeavor. 
Table 7, Core Case Study Investigator skills                 (Yin 2003) 
Question Asking Case studies require the ability to ask good questions during data 
collection, not just before and after. 
Listening The investigator should be completely open and not trapped by 
ideologies or preconceptions.  
Adaptiveness and 
Flexibility 
Remember the original purpose of the study, but be willing to 
adapt procedures or plans if unanticipated events occur. 
Grasp of Issues 
being studied 
Understand the purpose of the case.  Without that the investigator 
could miss important clues and would not know when a deviation 
was acceptable or desirable. 
Lack of Bias Investigators must guard against substantiating a preconceived 
position. 
 
Case Study training 
The goal of the training is to have all participants understand the fundamental 
ideas, language, and issues germane to the study (Yin 2003).  Each investigator should 
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know why the study is being undertaken, what evidence is being sought, what variations 
can be anticipated, and what would constitute supportive or contrary evidence for any 
given proposition (Yin 2003). 
Designing the Case Study Protocol 
A case study protocol contains procedures and general rules that should be 
followed in using the data collection instrument. It is to be created prior to the data 
collection phase. It is essential in a multiple-case study, and desirable in a single-case 
study. Yin presented the design protocol as a major component in asserting the reliability 
of the case study research. A typical protocol should have the following sections: 
• An overview of the case study project -objectives, issues, topics being 
investigated   
• Field procedures -credentials and access to sites, sources of information, and 
procedural reminders  
• Case study questions -specific questions that the investigator must keep in mind 
during data collection  
• A guide for case study report (outline, format for the narrative)  (Yin 2003).   
Each element as it pertains to the case under study is specified in greater detail below. 
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Overview of the Case Study Project 
The overview contains background information and issues being investigated 
as outlined earlier in this chapter and chapter 1.  It should also contain relevant 
readings covering those issues. 
 
Field Procedures 
As mentioned above these items need to emphasize the major tasks in 
collecting data for the case study(Yin 2003).  Access to Site 1 medical network 
support personnel was dictated by their work schedule and the Operational Readiness 
Inspection (ORI) under way.  Interview sessions had to be rescheduled on one 
occassion.  Interview sessions with Site 2 network support staff was put onhold until 
personnel returned from leave.  The session times were also dictated by the 
availabilty of a conference room in which to conduct them.  
The case study protocol is important for two reasons.  First, it keeps the 
investigator targeted on the subject of the case study.  Second, preparing the protocol 
forces the researcher to anticipate some problems (Yin 2003). 
Case Study Questions 
Case study questions are posed to the investigator, and must serve to remind that person 
of the data to be collected and its possible sources. They are the heart of this protocol.  
The set consists of level 1 – questions asked of specific interviewees and level 2 – 
questions asked of the individual case (Yin 2003).  The interview questions are listed 
later in this chapter in the Data Collection. 
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Case Study Report Guide 
The guide for the case study report is often omitted from case study plans, since 
investigators view the reporting phase as being far in the future (Tellis 1997).  Yin 
proposed that the report be planned at the start (Yin 1994). The reason for the absence of 
a fixed reporting format is that each case study is unique. The data collection, research 
questions and indeed the unit of analysis cannot be placed into a fixed mold as in 
experimental research (Tellis 1997).  Since case studies do not have a widely accepted 
reporting format - the experience of the investigator is a key factor in determining the 
format of the final product. 
Screening Case Study Nominations 
Two factors played a major role in determining which locations of those 90 slated for 
integration would serve as the case study.  These were geographical location and size of 
the Air Force installation and the medical facility that supported the base community.  
Site 1 was chosen due to its proximity and classification as a large medical facility 
supporting a large active duty and retired personnel community.  Site 2 was selected due 
its classification as medium sized medical facility and also supporting a large active duty 
and retired personnel population. 
 
Pilot Case Study 
Although the researcher was located at one of the selected sites no pilot study was 
performed due to time constraints.  Therefore, this research is meant to be exploratory 
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and further research will be warranted. This study is meant to be the basis from which 
further research can springboard from. 
Data Collection 
Once the protocol has been developed and tested, it puts the research project into 
the second phase – its execution.  In this phase the primary activity is that of data 
collection. The protocol described above addresses the types of evidence that are 
available in the case organization. In this case study, data collection is treated as a design 
issue that will enhance the construct and internal validity of the study, as well as the 
external validity and reliability(Yin 1994).  Table 8 contains six sources of evidence with 
both strengths and weaknesses. No single source has a complete advantage over the 
others; rather, they might be complementary and could be used in tandem. Thus a case 
study should use as many sources as are relevant to the study (Yin 2003).  This research 
will deal the first three- documents, archival documents, and interviews. 
Documents could be letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, 
newspaper articles, or any document that is germane to the investigation. In the interest of 
triangulation of evidence, the documents serve to corroborate the evidence from other 
sources. Documents are also useful for making inferences about events, but this can 
produce false leads.  This has resulted in criticism of case study research.  Archival 
documents can be service records, organizational records, survey data, and other such 
records.  They often take the form of computer files and records.   
The investigator has to be careful in evaluating the accuracy of the records before 
using them. Even if the records are quantitative, they might still not be accurate.  Large 
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quantities don’t mean the source evidence is necessarily accurate (Yin 2003).   Interviews 
are one of the most important sources of case study information. There are several forms 
of interviews that are possible: open-ended, focused, and structured or survey.   
In an open-ended interview, key respondents are asked to comment about certain 
events. They may propose solutions or provide insight into events. They may also 
corroborate evidence obtained from other sources. The researcher must avoid becoming 
dependent on a single informant, and seek the same data from other sources to verify its 
authenticity.  Key informants are often critical to the success of the case study (Yin 
2003). 
The focused interview is used in a situation where the respondent is interviewed 
for a short period of time, usually answering set questions developed from the case study 
protocol.  This technique is often used to confirm data collected from another source (Yin 
2003).  The structured interview is similar to a survey. The questions are detailed and 
developed in advance, much as they are in a survey. 
Direct observation in a case study occurs when the investigator makes a site visit 
to gather data. The observations could be formal or casual activities, but the reliability of 
the observation is the main concern.  Using multiple observers is one way to increase 
reliability.  Participant observation is a unique mode of observation in which the 
researcher may actually participate in the events being studied (Tellis 1997).  
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Table 8.  Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses (Yin 2003) 
Source of 
Evidence 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation • stable - repeated review  
• unobtrusive - exist prior to 
case study  
• exact - names etc.  
• broad coverage - extended 
time span  
• retrievability - difficult  
• biased selectivity  
• reporting bias - reflects author bias  
• access - may be blocked  
Archival Records • Same as above  
• precise and quantitative  
• Same as above  
• privacy might inhibit access  
Interviews • targeted - focuses on case 
study topic  
• insightful - provides 
perceived causal inferences  
• bias due to poor questions  
• response bias  
• incomplete recollection  
• reflexivity - interviewee expresses 
what interviewer wants to hear  
Direct Observation • reality - covers events in real 
time  
• contextual - covers event 
context  
• time-consuming  
• selectivity - might miss facts  
• reflexivity - observer's presence might 
cause change  
• cost - observers need time  
Participant 
Observation 
• Same as above  
• insightful into interpersonal 
behavior  
• Same as above  
• bias due to investigator's actions  
Physical Artifacts • insightful into cultural 
features  
• insightful into technical 
operations  
• selectivity  
• availability  
The main concern is the potential bias of the researcher as an active participant. While the 
information may not be available in any other way, the drawbacks should be carefully 
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considered by the researcher.   Physical artifacts could be any physical evidence that 
might be gathered during a site visit.  That might include tools, art works, notebooks, 
computer output, and other such physical evidence.  This exploratory case study uses 
documentation exclusively pertaining to the integration of medical information networks 
and systems.  A hybrid of focused and open ended interviews was conducted with 
medical network support personnel.  Subjects had an average of six years of practical 
experience in the telecommunication field. 
 
  The following interview questions address the research questions and 
propositions:   
1. How is your shop set up? 
2. Where do you take direction from? 
3. How are the networks in the hospital configured? 
4. Are computerized devices currently logically separated from the rest of the 
network? 
5. Are there plans to do that? 
6. Are imaging, billing, and patient records integrated? 
7.  Are there currently any back door connections outside the network? 
8. Are you aware of any AF initiatives? 
9. Timeline for completion? 
10. Are the systems /circuits currently accredited? 
11. If so, what does the process entail? 
12. Are medical devices still under the mgt of vendors and fall subject to existing 
FDA guidelines & policies? 
13. How are security patches implemented? 
14. How are security incidents/updates reported? 
15.  Other issues? 
46 
Question Development 
Table 9- Question development analysis 
Interview Question Supporting 
Investigative 
Question 
Proposition
Supported 
1 6 1 
2 5 1 
3 1 3,1 
4 1 3,1 
5 1 3,1 
6 1,2 3,1,2 
7 1 3,1,2 
8 4,5 1,2 
9 4,5 2 
10 4,5 1,2,3 
11 4 1,2,3 
12 4,5 3,1 
13 4 1,2 
14 4 1,2 
15 6 1,2 
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Pre-interview Procedures 
The nature of the topic restricted the pool of potential interviewees to individuals 
working in the either medical network support field.  Candidates also had to have 
knowledge of ongoing projects pertaining to the integration of the medical information 
systems.  Medical network support leadership aided in identifying qualified individuals 
for this study. In qualitative research, purposeful selection of participants or sites 
provides the best opportunity for the researcher to address the research questions 
(Creswell, 2003).  
To reduce any bias, interviewees were informed of the study’s goal to merely 
assess, not judge the integration of medical information systems, organizations, or 
personnel involved.  Participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous.  Interview 
questions were provided to participants at least 24 hours in advance.  Each participant 
provided an email address to facilitate review and approval of their responses.  Any 
requested modifications received via the email feedback loop were accomplished before 
any answers were analyzed.  Participants were offered a copy of the final report. 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis can be either a holistic analysis of the entire case or an 
embedded analysis of a specific aspect of the case (Creswell 1998).  As stated earlier in 
this chapter this research study utilizes theoretical propositions for the general analytic 
strategy and pattern matching and cross-case synthesis as the specific analytical 
techniques. 
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Theoretical Propositions 
This is the first and most preferred strategy (Yin 2003).  The propositions 
introduced in Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter were based on the original objectives 
and design of the case study protocol.  They shaped the data collection plan and would 
have given priorities to relevant analytic strategies. This study’s purpose is to assess the 
Air Force’ integration plan for the medical information networks and systems.  The 
theoretical propositions directed the exploration of this endeavor with a focus on key 
issues and sources of concern. 
Pattern Matching 
 Pattern-matching is considered as one of the most desirable strategies for 
analysis. This technique compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. If 
the patterns match, the internal reliability of the study is enhanced (Trochim 1989). This 
study compares patterns from multiple cases, open-ended interviews, and focused 
interviews.  The details of the comparison are included in chapter IV. 
 
Research Limitations 
As mentioned in chapter I there are several limiting factors for this research study.  
First, the number of medical facilities scheduled for integration.  The Air Force’s Medical 
Information Technology Transition (MITT) plan has directed this work to be completed 
at 90 Air Force locations worldwide.  This research studies medical facilities at only two 
locations in detail to assess the Air Force initiative and draw a correlation to the rest of 
medical facilities.  .  Second, little research exists on the current Air Force projects.  As a 
result, there is not much to build upon.  Third, people tend not to speak negatively.  Even 
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if the facts and conditions warrant it.  Time represents the final major limitation for study.  
The importance and difficulty of this study command more time than this effort can 
provide.  This study aims to establish the basis for additional research.        
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the process used to answer the research questions 
presented in Chapter I of this research study.  This chapter discussed the qualitative 
research approach, characteristics of good qualitative research, and the case study 
method, case study research design, conducting the case study, preparing for data 
collection, data collection, data analysis, and research limitations.  
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IV. Results 
Overview 
This chapter provides the results of the research methodology outlined in chapter III and the 
model shown here in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8, research Model 
Figure 8 depicts the proposed model for how a secure integration of the medical 
networks can be achieved.  The resultant data from this study supports the claims of the 
model.  The results are based on focused interviews of medical network support 
personnel and a detailed literature review.  This chapter is arranged into four sections.  
First, a description of the sites used in this research is provided.  Two sites were used in 
this study to address the six investigative questions and answer the main research 
question.   Second, an overview of the interview data is presented.  Third, each 
Secure 
Integrated 
Medical 
Standards 
Singular 
How? 
Direction 
 Coordinated 
Implementation 
 
Legal 
51 
investigative question is answered and summarized.  Lastly, the main research question is 
addressed.   
Site Descriptions 
This section provides a description of the two sites chosen for this research 
project.  The locations were selected due to their  designation in the Medical Information 
Technology Transition (MITT Last mile Design (LMD) System Design Document 
(SDD)(Headquarters Electronics Systems Center 2004).   Both sites are located within 
the continental United States, but operationally support different Air Force major 
commands.  Another factor in their selection was how they are representative of the 
entire Air Force medical community.  Site 1 was chosen due its being a large medical 
facility and supporting network.  Site 2 is representative of a medium sized medical 
facility and supporting network.  Information reflected in this section is based on focused 
interviews with network support personnel.  All but one Site 1 interviews were completed 
face to face.  Data from site 2 was gathered via telephone interviews. 
 
Site 1 
Site 1 has a Gigabit uplink to the base LAN via vendor C switch.  Site 1 has 
redundant connectivity from vendor A core switches to their server farm 
(file/print/application/ database).  Both switches have a 100 MB Ethernet connection to 
each server.  Multimode fiber, CAT 5 cable, a 100 Megabit FFDI ring, and an 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) connection to vendor B switches form the 
backbone within the medical facility.  There are 100 MB connections to the CHCS core 
nodes, clinical information servers, and vendor D Picture Archiving and Communications 
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System (PACS).  In addition Site 1 has 10MB Ethernet links to the legacy PACS and 
CHCS network. 
Site 1 also has a partnership with a local hospital.  The partnership allows Site 1 
to utilize the hospital’s staff to read digital images.  To facilitate this ability there is a 
Gigabit connection from Site 1’s PAC across the base Metropolitan Area Network 
(MAN) and through the firewall to a workstation at the local hospital.   Four personnel 
from Site 1 were interviewed for this research project. 
Site 2 
Site 2 also has a Gigabit uplink to the base LAN via vendor X switch.  Site 2 has 
redundant connectivity from vendor Y core switches to their server farm 
(file/print/application/ database).  The switches have multiple fiber connections for 
redundancy.  Fiber optic connections to vendor B switches form the backbone within the 
medical facility.  The CHCS network is completely separate and maintained by 
contractors.  Site 2 also has teamed with local hospitals to provide reading of digital 
imagery after hours.  Three personnel from Site 2 were interviewed via telephone for this 
research study. 
Interview Data 
Site 1network support management identified personnel that would provide the 
necessary insight and knowledge for this research study.  The personnel identified by the 
superintendent have been supporting the medical facility and its network for an average 
of five years.  The interviews were conducted on an individual basis.  All but one was 
accomplished face to face.  Face to face interviews were not possible due to work loads at 
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Site 2.  Two interviews were accomplished with Site 2 personnel.  All key informants 
possessed at least 4 years experience supporting the medical community. 
 
Investigative Questions 
This section addresses each of the six investigative questions separately.  
Evidence in the form of interview data, supporting literature, and a summary of the 
convergent information is presented.  Refer back to table six in chapter III for mapping of 
Investigative questions and interview questions. 
      Investigative Question one 
 How are medical devices integrated into the medical facilities networks? 
The results of this study indicate the manner in which medical devices are handled is 
different throughout the Air Force.  Factors that determine this include the services the 
medical facility offer and the physical make up of the network itself.  Although 
Collmann(Collmann 2003) suggests that logically separating the devices will aid in 
mitigating the risk of their vulnerabilities it was not accomplished at either location.   
 
Interview question three 
• How are the networks in the hospital configured? 
 
The responses to this question indicate that there isn’t any standard configuration.  
The network configuration is primarily based upon the medical facility’s mission.  The 
Site 1 personnel stated that there is an additional connection to a local hospital.  This 
connection was due to the personnel constraints at Site 1.  In addition, Site 1 interviewees 
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responded that there are often occasions in which medical personnel connect to the 
network from home. This connection permits medical staff to access digital imagery.  
The staff then can make a determination if the situation warrants them driving to the 
facility to treat the patient.  After a further discussion of their responses, two of the 
interviewees indicated that initially the doctors were buying business class internet 
service to obtain static IP addresses and establishing & maintaining the remote 
connections through the use of a Remote Access Servers (RAS).   However, this changed 
after the base communication squadron forced them to change to a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN).  This attempt was unsuccessful due to the PAC not working properly 
when using a Proxy.  The communication squadron was forced to allow the connection to 
“punch through” the firewall to get it to work.  
  The initial Site 2 personnel responses also indicated that there wasn’t a standard 
configuration at that location.  The difference at Site 2 was that the Combined HealthCare 
System (CHCS) is separate.  It doesn’t connect into the medical facility’s network.  Site 2 
also has an established partnership with local hospitals to provide after hours care.  Site 2 
has two T-1 connections to local university medical centers. 
Interview questions four & five 
• Are computerized devices currently logically separated from the rest of the 
network? 
• If not, are there plans to do that? 
The responses to these questions indicate that there is no uniformity in which medical 
devices are connected.  Two interviewees at Site 1 indicated that although the devices are 
physically connected to the network; the devices are logically separated.  The other 
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interviewee stated that “all DITSCAP approved or grandfathered medical equipment is 
currently connected to the network similar to any PC on the network.  New un-approved 
medical equipment that we are testing has been placed in a separate or private segment of 
the network while it’s being evaluated.  This is done on a case by case basis.  This private 
segment of the network is created by placing the medical devices behind a router, and 
then applying Access Control Lists (ACL) preventing traffic flow to essential traffic in 
and out of the separated network”.   
The interviewee further added that “they hope to develop a better enterprise 
solution for this issue by placing a true firewall inside the medical center that we can put 
all of the medical devices we control behind, and create a separate "medical network" 
which would not have the same requirements when it comes to security patching”.  The 
interviewee also stated that “patching is something they have a very hard time staying 
current with”. 
The initial Site 2 personnel responded that they didn’t work with the medical 
devices, nor did they have any knowledge of how they were connected.  The 
interviewees’ responses indicated that the devices were treated more like ordinary 
hospital equipment.  The devices were maintained by a different flight within the 
hospital. Results from a subsequent interview with personnel from that flight indicate that 
Site 2 has limited medical devices within the facility and that they are both logically and 
physically separate from the facility’s main network.  The individual stated that only 
laboratory equipment connected into the Composite Health Care System (CHCS).   
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Interview question six 
• Are imaging, billing, and patient records integrated? 
 
Site 1 interviewees advised that yes imaging, billing, and patient information is 
integrated in the CHCS system.  One interviewee further added that information is 
intended for demographics only.  The information isn’t transmitted outside the facility.  
Site 2 personnel responded that the data is also integrated at their location.  However, it is 
stored in servers used strictly for clinical information within the facility.  It doesn’t enter 
the CHCS network.   
Interview question seven 
• Are there currently any back door connections outside the network? 
Site 1 personnel advised the Combat Information Transport System (CITS) team 
had performed a network analysis and assessment approximately six to eight months ago 
and terminated the two “back door” connections that had previously existed.  This was 
done in preparation for implementing the Medical Information Technology Transition 
(MITT) Last mile Design (LMD).  
Site two personnel disagreed amongst themselves.  One interviewee stated that 
there are no back door connections.  That individual didn’t mention the remote 
connectivity to the local hospitals either. The other two interviewees responded that there 
were direct connections to the local hospitals.  These connections didn’t transverse the 
base firewall or LAN.  One interviewee added further that there were “1 or 2” dial up 
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connections to companies in support of other functions of the Medical Treatment Facility 
(MTF) and its daily operations. 
Investigative question one results summary 
 
Convergent evidence is provided to support the belief that the integration of 
medical devices in Air Force facilities is not standardized.  The devices are integrated 
based upon the facilities own mission and the services they provide.  There is also 
evidence to suggest that although the medical devices are physically or logically 
separated they are still vulnerable to possible attacks due to remote connections and patch 
management.  
 
Investigative Question two 
• How does the plan address adherence to HIPPA? 
With the exception of two individuals at Site 1 none of the other interviewees 
were aware of the Air Force’s plan to integrate the medical information networks.  The 
initiatives under way at both locations to adhere to Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) were separate from the MITT design.  Positions were 
created at both locations to ensure compliance.   
Interview question six 
• Are imaging, billing, and patient records integrated? 
 
 Site 1and Site 2 interviewees advised that imaging, billing, and patient 
information is integrated. The information isn’t transmitted outside the medical facilities. 
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A Site 1 interviewee responded that DoD has mandated that all services implement some 
sort of risk assessment and analysis system to ensure laws mandated in the security 
portion of HIPAA are met.  The interviewee stated that the Air Force has chosen 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) (Dorofee 
2001) to strategically assess and plan security techniques for HIPAA compliance.  The 
interviewee further stated that the OCTAVE was implemented in June 2004 and that 
“Site 1 was now completing the baseline security and gap analysis”. 
 
Literature Review 
HIPAA mandates that healthcare facilities implement physical safeguards for 
systems and workstations that access electronic protected health information (PHI) in 
order to restrict access to authorized users.  In addition the medical treatment facility 
(MTF) must also utilize technical safeguards to enable secure access to data(Services and 
Rights 2003).  As stated in chapter II MTFs must implement security risk management to 
develop threat control, detection, and response processes. 
 
Investigative question two results summary 
 
Convergent evidence is provided to suggest that the MITT (Medical Information 
Technology Transition) Last mile Design (LMD) doesn’t take HIPAA into account.  The 
MITT design document does state HIPAA as being a constraint, but doesn’t offer any 
plans or methods to deal with the issue.  The MITT LMD doesn’t mention the required 
implementation of security risk management at MTFs either.  The interviewee Responses 
to this question do provide insight on how the Air Force is attempting to comply with 
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HIPAA.  The creation of HIPAA positions at both sites is a start.  The data does suggest 
that theses the personnel deal more with HIPAA complaints rather than HIPAA 
compliance.  The absence of security risk management and remote connections at both 
sites do provide a means in which the integrity of the PHI is at jeopardy.  
Investigative Question three 
 Does the integration of the medical information systems into the base networks 
change the classification of the system under the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC)?  If so, does this make them more susceptible to attack? 
The interviewee responses from both locations were clouded with uncertainty.  
All personnel weren’t sure of just how the medical systems were being integrated into the 
base networks.  Most of the interviewees also believed that the vulnerability for attack 
existed whether or not the medical systems were connected to the base. 
Interview question four  
• Are computerized devices currently logically separated from the rest of the 
network? 
 
 The data suggests that there is no standardization for medical device 
connectivity.  Interviewees were divergent in their answers.   Believes differed as to if the 
devices were physically and or logically separated from the rest of the network.  The data 
further suggests that there is no segregation of medical information from the rest of daily 
operational data at Site 1 or Site 2.  
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Literature Review 
Chapter II identified that the LOAC are broken down into two types of law- customary 
international law and treaty law.  Treaty law is concerned mainly with the means and 
methods of warfare (e.g., lawful and unlawful weapons, targeting) (Strand 2004).   LOAC 
also stipulates that attacks must be limited to military objectives (Strand 2004). 
LOAC defines military objectives are objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage(Strand 2004).  Examples of this include troops, bases, 
supplies, lines of communications, and headquarters.   
Hospitals are civilian objects.  Civilian objects are awarded special protection.  
However, they can lose their protective status if they are used to make a contribution to 
the military action.  This interpretation of LOAC suggests that medical data be physically 
and logically separated to prevent a hospital’s loss of civilian object status.  
These guidelines suggest that data of a medical nature be physically segregated as much 
as possible from information that can invite hostile targeting.  Complete physical segregation is 
not currently feasible due to cost, maintenance, and other considerations.  Most AF bases do not 
completely segregate medical and non-medical traffic because an Air Force base is considered to 
be a trusted network for medical traffic.  Also given the make up of the United States adversaries 
today will it matter if the data isn’t separated?  Today’s enemies either just don’t care if 
collateral damage occurs or they possess the tools to spin control the damage through control of 
the media. 
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Investigative question three results summary 
 
 Complete physical segregation is not currently feasible due to cost, maintenance, and 
other considerations.  Most AF bases do not completely segregate medical and non-
medical traffic because Air Force leadership is under the belief that Air Force bases are a 
trusted network.  MITT will logically integrate medical data and physically connect 
medical systems into the Air Force network.  Air Force leadership believes that the 
integration of the medical networks won’t matter.  They believe that the hospitals will 
still be afforded the status of civilian object under the LOAC.  The LOAC only apply to 
nations that wish to abide by them and have signed treaties to state they will.  Today’s 
enemies of the United States don’t recognize LOAC nor do they abide by them.  They 
either just don’t care if collateral damage occurs or they possess the tools to spin control 
the damage through control of the media. 
   
Investigative Question four 
 Is the implementation of several projects/initiatives increasing the possibility for 
security vulnerabilities? 
 
During the course of this research multiple initiatives were discovered by the 
researcher to be underway.  The interviewees were aware of only one or two and they 
weren’t the same ones.    
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Interview question eight & nine 
• Are you aware of any AF initiatives? 
• Timeline for completion? 
 
Table 10 depicts the responses the interviewees gave when asked interview questions 
eight and nine.  Interviewees 1-4 are from Site 1.  Interviewees 5-7 are from Site 2. 
Interviewee 1 stated that MITT had been completed, where as interviewees 2 & 3 stated 
that they had been informed that project had slipped six months.  They were informed 
that MITT wouldn’t be implemented at Site1 until sometime in 2005. 
 
Table 10- Initiative awareness of Site personnel 
Initiative Interviewee 
1 
Interviewee 
2 
Interviewee 
3 
Interviewee  
4 
Interviewee 
5 
Interviewee 
6 
Interviewee 
7 
MITT X* X X  X*   
Block 30 X       
CHCS II X  X* X X*  X 
Local 
project 
    X   
Majcom 
project 
      X 
OCTAVE    X    
 
They were informed that MITT wouldn’t be implemented at Site1 until sometime in 
2005.   Interviewees 6 & 7 responded that they were unaware of the MITT 
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implementation at Site 2.   Interviewee 5 was aware of MITT and stated the service level 
agreement (SLA) had yet to be signed.  Only interviewee 1 was aware of the CITS 
(Combat Information Transport System) Block 30 initiative.  He responded that he didn’t 
know the timeline for completion though.  Only four interviewees were aware of the 
CHCS II upgrade.  Interview 3 thought it had been halted due to performance issues.  
Interviewee 5 just knew it was ongoing, but no status as he didn’t have anything to do 
with it.  Personnel from site 2 also advised of other initiatives.  One was a base 
undertaking.  The interviewee (number 5) stated “that commander wanted this (the 
project) and it was their responsibility to implement it”.   Interviewee 7 stated that the 
major command was possibly implementing a PACS system within the year. 
Interview questions ten & eleven 
• Are the systems /circuits currently accredited? 
• If so, what does the process entail? 
 
Responses from both Site 1& 2 indicated that the medical systems and networks 
were accredited.  One interviewee from Site 1 responded that if the device wasn’t 
accredited or had a waiver it wasn’t connected to the network. 
 Interviewees included the individuals who are responsible for ensuring the accreditation 
process is completed.  One interviewee stated that the systems were accredited in 
conformance with the DoD Information Technology Security Certification & 
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP).  DITSCAP covers the physical, personnel, 
administrative, information, and information systems areas of the system under question.  
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The security personnel gather all pertinent information and submit it to the proper 
authorities.  
Interview question twelve 
• Are medical devices still under the mgt of vendors and fall subject to existing 
FDA guidelines & policies? 
Personnel responses from both locations indicate the FDA is still regulating the 
patch management and software updates for medical devices.  Site 1 interviewees 
responded that they were aware of an initiative by the Air force to ask the FDA to allow 
Air Force personnel to implement patch updates in certain situations.  
Interview question thirteen 
• How are security patches implemented? 
 
Site 2 personnel responded that they only had responsibility for a limited number 
of devices; mainly laboratory equipment.  These devices are patched in accordance with 
FDA and Air Force guidelines.  Site 1 personnel indicated that there were devices 
connected to the network which currently have approved waivers permitting the devices 
not to have the latest patches installed on them.  They also stated that there are devices 
which have the latest patches and are updated in accordance with FDA and Air Force 
guidelines. 
Interview question fourteen 
• How are security incidents/updates reported? 
Site 1and 2  interviewees responded that incidents or updates were reported as 
follows: operator/analyst to security manager to supporting Communication squadron 
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personnel to major command Network Operations Center (NOC) to Air force Network 
Operations center (AFNOC). 
 
Investigative question four results summary 
The responses indicate that there are holes in the approaches taken at both Site 1 
and Site 2.  This suggests that multiple project or initiatives increase the possibility for 
security vulnerabilities.  It was suggested by interviewees from both sites that often 
multiple projects, either occurring simultaneously or in concurrence tend to leave out 
important aspects (such as information security). They believed this was due to time 
constraints or more often lack of funding.   
Investigative Question five 
 Is direction being given from a single point or multiple agencies/ commands? 
  
Interview question two 
• Where do you take direction from? 
 
Site 1 personnel all responded that they received direction from a singular point; 
however they pointed out that the medical facility received funding from another 
organization.  Interviewees from site 2 indicated that they also receive direction from a 
single point- on the surface.  A Site 2 interviewee responded that they still have to 
support the local commander and sometimes that is a different direction from the normal 
chain of command 
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Interview questions eight & nine 
• Are you aware of any AF initiatives? 
• Timeline for completion? 
As shown in table 10 above interviewee responses were diverse.  Responses 
indicate that there is conflicting direction due to multiple sources.  
Interview question ten 
• Are the systems /circuits currently accredited? 
 
 Their initial configuration(s) has been verified and approved by the Designated 
Approving Authority (DAA).  This is part of the DITSCAP accreditation process.   
Interview question twelve 
 
• Are medical devices still under the mgt of vendors and fall subject to existing 
FDA guidelines & policies? 
Responses from interviewees indicate that medical device patch 
management is still the responsibility of the equipment manufacturer.  The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) provides guidance for patch updates of these 
devices.  Site 1 personnel responded that there devices which have been granted 
waivers present on the network. 
Investigative question five results summary 
There is convergent evidence that suggests there are often multiple lines of 
authority and direction provided from them.  Implementation for today’s projects and 
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instruction is sometimes being left open for personal interpretation or agendas.  Evidence 
suggests that there is conflicting direction from multiple sources.   
 
Investigative Question six 
 Are there other issues that are not addressed under the current plan? 
 
The interviewee’s responses to the other investigative questions have identified 
the areas that are lacking.  There are issues such as HIPAA and LOAC that are 
mentioned, but not thought through as to how they are going to be dealt with.   There is 
no mention of how these issues affect implementation of the medical networks or 
operationally the medical community.  
Interview question fifteen 
• Other issues? 
Investigative question six results summary 
The interviewees did not provide any other issues than those already identified by 
the previous interview questions. 
Main Research Question 
 
 How is the Air Force addressing the integration of the medical systems and 
networks under the policy of “One Air Force, One Network? 
The Air Force is attempting to integrate the medical systems and networks mainly 
by looking at the technical aspects of the undertaking.   The results of the six 
investigative questions support this submission.   Existing literature shows that the other 
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aspects mentioned in this research need to be addressed.  The main research question is 
answered by the results of the six investigative questions.  
 To address investigative question one, interview data established the manner in 
which medical devices are handled is different throughout the Air Force. There is no 
standardization.  It was also identified that although the medical devices are physically or 
logically separated they are still vulnerable to possible attacks due to remote connections 
and patch management. 
  To address investigative question two, interview data and existing literature identified 
the MITT (Medical Information Technology Transition) Last mile Design (LMD) doesn’t 
take HIPAA into account.  Although mentioned it doesn’t provide direction or even 
alternate plans or methods to deal with HIPAA compliance.  Interview data did identify 
how the Air Force is attempting to comply with HIPAA, however the absence of security 
risk management and remote connections at both sites do provide a means in which the 
integrity of the Protected Health Information (PHI) is at jeopardy.  
To address investigative question three, interview data and existing literature 
identified that Air Force leadership believes that the integration of the medical networks 
won’t change the classification of the systems.   They believe that the hospitals will still 
be afforded the status they previously held under the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).  
To address investigative question four, interview data identified that there often are holes 
in the approaches taken.  This supports the premise of multiple projects or initiatives 
increase the possibility for security vulnerabilities.  Multiple responses further identified 
that often multiple projects tend to leave out important aspects (such as information 
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security and LOAC classification). Factors that were identified to affect this issue are 
time constraints or lack of funding.   
To address investigative question five, interview data identified there are often 
multiple lines of authority and direction provided from them.  Evidence suggests that 
there is conflicting direction from multiple sources.  To address investigative question 
six, interview data identified there weren’t any other issues than those already identified 
by the previous interview questions. 
 
 
 
Table 11, Factors affecting Main Research Question Summary. 
 
Issue Sound  
Plan 
Multiple 
Plans 
No 
Plan 
Legal Guidance 
HIPPA 
  ? 
Legal Guidance 
LOAC 
  X 
Standards  X  
Singular 
Direction 
 X  
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the research methodology outlined in 
Chapter III.  Focused interviews of medical network support personnel and a detailed 
literature review were used to provide convergent sources of information for reaching the 
presented results.  Two sites were used in this study to address the six investigative 
questions and in due course answer the main research question.   Table 11 above depicts 
the factors identified in the research model presented in Chapter III. The table shows the 
results of the completed assessment as to whether the Air Force has reliable guidance in 
place to address these issues.    
Table 11 shows that not only is there conflicting guidance in the areas of 
standards and singular direction, but that there is no direction in legal guidance.  
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V. Conclusions & Recommendations 
Overview 
The purpose of this exploratory research dealing with the Air Force’s integration 
of medical networks and systems into the Air Force network was to provide an 
understanding of issues involved and afford a basis for further investigation.  Interview 
transcripts and existing literature provided evidence that the Air Force is concentrating on 
the technology under the current plan.  This chapter covers a discussion of the research, 
implications, and recommendation; suggestions for future research; and a summary.    
Implications 
Given the lack of previous research and newness of the subject matter, the 
results can provide many contributions.   The most significant being the basis from which 
a survey can be developed.  The survey can consist of close ended questions.  Close-
ended questions list answers, and respondents select either one or multiple responses. 
These questions produce more uniform answers than open-ended questions, but depend 
upon your knowing and including all relevant responses in the list. Responses to close-
ended questions must be exhaustive and also mutually exclusive in providing for the 
selection of a single response (Sawer 1984).  The survey could be distributed Air Force 
wide providing a clearer picture of project implementation and coordination, status of 
HIPAA compliance, and the other issued addressed in this research.   
Suggested Future Research 
This section outlines opportunities for future research.  The first opportunity 
consists of duplicating this study using locations with similar sized medical facilities, 
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networks, and services offered to determine if the results are complimentary.  A 
comparison of similar sized medical networks will determine if identified differences and 
results are unique to this study.   Another research prospect would be to study the 
combination of HIPAA and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) more in depth.  The 
research could aid in determining the growing legal ramifications facing information 
systems. 
A third research opportunity would be to study the current standards in place 
governing such things as information assurance (IA), system security, and information 
classification.  New technologies such as WIFI, cell phones, and Blackberries introduce 
new vulnerabilities not seen before (Gray 2005).  In addition the new concept of software 
standardization could be looked at in greater detail.  This could help in ascertaining if the 
program works in limiting the vulnerabilities and intruder attacks or if it just a way to 
save the Air Force money.  A fourth research opportunity would be the conducting of the 
survey mentioned above.  This survey could aid greatly in identifying inadequate 
processes and procedures affecting the whole Air Force network. 
Summary  
The far-reaching, ever-expanding, and ever more rapid advances in technology 
and the tactics employed by would be intruders over the last five years demand that the 
Air Force scrutinize all facets of integration.  Singular direction, well defined standards, 
safe guarding information, and sound engineered and implemented technical capabilities 
are vital if the Air Force is to be successful in their transformation to Net -centric warfare 
and meeting the goals outlined in Air Force vision 2020.  
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The goal of this research was to assess the Air Force’s implementation of the 
transition (MITT) of medical information systems into the Air Force Network.  From this 
assessment a survey could be conducted to further evaluate the policies, procedures, and 
standards in place across the Air Force concerning information system integration.  
Deficiencies in any of these areas could potentially have devastating effects.   The 
following quote from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder displays the importance of 
protecting our networks: “For a real-world terrorist to blow up a dam, he would need tons 
of explosives, a delivery system, and a surreptitious means of evading armed security 
guards.  For a cyber terrorist, the same devastating result could be achieved by hacking 
into the control network and commanding the computer to open the floodgates”(Holder 
2000). 
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Appendix A:  Human Research Exception Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Aug 04  
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR  AFIT/ENV 
 AFIT/ENR 
 AFRL/HEH 
 IN TURN 
 
FROM:  AFIT/ENV 
 
SUBJECT:  Request for Exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements (AFI 
40-402): Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV, Vulnerabilities inherent to Medical Information  
Systems. 
 
1. Request exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements of AFI 40-402 for 
the proposed study of medical information systems and the vulnerabilities they introduce 
into networks in conjunction with thesis research at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology.  Purpose of this study is to investigate if the AF’s proposed plan covers all 
possible contingences when adding the medical systems to the base network 
architectures.  The results of this study may provide additional areas  that need to be 
addressed for successful implementation of the Air Force’s plan.    
2. This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 
101, paragraph (b)(2), which states “research activities in which the only involvement of 
human subjects will be in one or more of the following categories are exempt from this 
policy:  (2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, 
aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public 
behavior”.  Information obtained will not be recorded in such a manner that human 
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects nor will 
any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial 
standing, employability, or reputation.  Methodology used to collect information for 
research is based on case study and expert interview procedures and involves less than 
minimal risk. The following information is provided to show cause for such an 
exemption: 
2.1. Equipment and facilities:  No special equipment or facilities will be used. 
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2.2. Subjects:  Subjects will be military and civilian leaders/managers in the 
communications or information technology career field, selected to participate in 
the study. 
 
2.3. Timeframe:  Data will be collected between Nov 04 and Dec 04. 
 
 
2.4. Data collected:  No identifying information obtained through interviews will 
be retained or reported in the final thesis.  In order to complete the research effort, 
data collected on individual subjects may include duty title and duration in current 
position, which will facilitate analysis and follow up for the duration of this study 
only.  Data gathering will be focused on organizational information specific to 
medical information systems, networks, and base level computer network 
architectures. 
 
2.5. Informed consent:  All subjects are self-selected to volunteer to participate in 
the interview process.  No adverse action is taken against those who choose not to 
participate.  Subjects are made aware of the nature and purpose of the research, 
sponsors of the research, and disposition of the survey results.  A copy of the 
Privacy Act Statement of 1974 is presented for their review. 
 
2.6. Risks to Subjects:  Individual responses of the subjects will not be disclosed.  
This eliminates any risks to the subjects as noted in paragraph 2.  There are no 
anticipated medical risks associated with this study. 
 
3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Master Sergeant Paul G. 
Oleksiak. at paul.oleksiak@afit.edu. 
 
 
 
 KEVIN L. ELDER Paul G. Oleksiak, MSgt, USAF 
Associate Professor, Information Resource Mgt                Student, Information Resource Mgt 
Primary Investigator Associate Investigator 
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Appendix B:  Interview questions 
 
1. How is your work center configured? 
2. Where do you take operational direction from? 
3.  How are the networks in the hospital configured? 
4.  Are computerized devices currently logically separated from the rest of the 
network? 
5. Are there plans to do that? 
6. Are imaging, billing, and patient records integrated? 
7.  Are there currently any back door connections outside the network? 
8. Are you aware of any AF initiatives? 
9. Timeline for completion? 
10. Are the systems /circuits currently accredited? 
11. If so, what does the process entail? 
12. Are medical devices still under the mgt of vendors and fall subject to existing 
FDA guidelines & policies? 
13. How are security patches implemented? 
14. How are security incidents/updates reported? 
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1986.  From 1995 until Aug 2003 he held positions in two Special Duty Assignments.  
While with Defense Information Systems Agency Europe (DISA-E) he developed the IP 
networking plan for EUCOM’s Op Plan 1003V and directed the implementation of 
numerous circuits and trunks in direct support of Operation IRAQI Freedom.   
During his career MSgt Oleksiak has been selected for early promotion to Senior 
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